some twenty minutes for questions and discussion at the end. If that's alright with you, I shall try now, in a short outline, to show to you how, over a period of nearly thirty years already, the relationship between Japan and the EC has grown from a very little small flame into, I think, quite a big light. Although it is not yet as big as I would like it to be. I shall deal successively with three distinct phases of this relationship, three periods. The first is what I would like to call the period of initial contacts between the EC and Japan, and Japan and the EC. That period started more or less in the 1960's. So the period of initial contacts, starting in the early 1960's, is the first period.
Then we have the period of what I would call the wider approaches which begins more or less in 1969; and finally the third period, which I call the period of the global framework, is the period which started in 1973, and in which we are still engaged today.
You all know that the first European Community creation was the European Coal and Steel Community, as you have just recalled. Now, when this Community was created, it certainly did not aim at all at playing an international role. In reality nobody thought of that.
People did not only not aim at that, they did not even realize that the realities of life would bring about a certain international role of even that first Community.
This Community was indeed essentially created to put our own European house in order, and by way of establishing a common market with free flow of goods and free competition, and to enhance the economic performance and economic strength of the partners.
It was not at all meant to become a power in the At that time also, the old Imperial Hotel was still as a jewel in 200 JAPAN-EC RELATIONS (E. WELLENSTEIN) the centre of the city, and we enjoyed very much staying there. The discussions we had with the Japanese government and the Japanese steel makers were to the effect that we should both try, by common action, to alleviate the tension on the American steel market so as to avoid protectionist measures. Exactly the same concept Mr. Inayama had in mind, so we could agree on those matters. It was when Mr.
Sato was Prime Minister and Mr. Shiina was Foreign Minister in your country, and these were, I think, the first ever really substantial discussions which had taken place in the early sixties, as I said, between the EC and the Japanese authorities and business circles.
We then also agreed with the Japanese authorities that, apart from this particular question, we would remain in regular consultation about matters of the steel market, and in that way I had the occasion to come back regularly to your country and to get acquainted with many Japanese friends. You see that the pattern of things, as it was established at that time, is really very much the same on which we have built later to establish the framework of consultations and also the spirit of consultations as we still have it today.
In the meantime in 1958, the European Economic Community, the general common market, had been launched, and that created a different and new situation. I shall now leave the Coal and Steel
Community and press on to what happened with the common market in Brussels. I said that created a new situation, and I meant in saying that, that this time a customs union was being established, which meant that the outside world was directly affected. Because the customs duties, the tariffs of the member countries, had to adopt to the common tariff, there was a direct repercussion on the trading partners of the members of the Community. late and we didn't manage to come to find common ground, and again the occasion slipped. Nevertheless, the visit was a useful one.
It now became a regular pattern of visits and contacts, and the EC -Japan relation had its own place in the external relations of the Community by now.
We must of course, consider that even at that moment, the trade of the Community with Japan and the trade of Japan with the Community, for both sides, was a small factor. Much smaller than, for instance, the Japanese American trade relation. In those years we spoke about Community exports about one billion dollars, a figure which today sounds rediculously small. We wouldn't be excited today about one billion dollars. At the time we were, because even then the structural deficit of the Community vis-a-vis Japan began to Soames, now Lord Soames, to Tokyo. On that occasion three things happened, three important things, on the one hand for the world, on the other hand for the EC -Japan relations. The first thing was that the Tokyo declaration was adopted, which led to the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations on a worldwide basis. We all know that not-withstanding the economic difficulties which erupted soon afterwards, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations has been a great success for which the basis was laid in Japan, which in a way symbolized that Japan began to properly occupy its responsibility in world economic relations.
Two other things which happened in September 1973 during that visit to Tokyo, were that the proposal was made to Japan to initiate these official high level regular consultations twice a year. And the proposal was accepted by the late Mr. Ohira, who was then Foreign
Minister of Japan. The Third point was that we settled in September 1973 with Minister Ohira, that the Community would open its own delegation, the EC delegation in Tokyo, accredited to the Japanese government.
Since that moment, we are engaged in ~ what I call the global framework, since that moment, the EC -Japan relation is not any more an item more or less in itself. It has become part of the world system of international economic relations and this world system rests on the triangle US -Japan -EC. I f world economic problems can lead to consensus in this triangle, the system works ; if we fail to reach consensus, the system suffers, or is even in danger. That is the significance today of EC -Japan relations as part of this global structure, and that brings with it enormous responsibility. Now, in that triangle the Japan -EC side is, economically speaking, the weakest because EC -Japan trade and Japan -EC trade is much smaller than US -Japan trade, which again is smaller than EC -US trade. The smallest side is the EC -Japan one. The Japan -EC side of the triangle is not only the smallest, it is also the narrowest, None of our countries could, even for a moment, think of a autarky as a system, as a policy. And we are both, for our wellbeing dependent on the ability to create added value, which in the large part has to be exported to pay for the imported raw materials. We are, therefore, Japan and the EC, vitally interested in technological advance in ever improved techniques of production in order to be able to produce this value added which we need for our well being. And summing all that up, one could say that we both have vested interest in good international political and economic relations. If the international relations suffer, our place 208
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in the world is immediately in jeopardy. I think that the striking similarities in geopolitical positions are not always sufficiently realized in our countries. They should, logically, permit us to find a good basis for cooperation because our interests go on the same direction.
Although we are, of course, competitors on each others markets, and on world markets, but fundamentally we depend on the same kind of system. We should be able to cooperate fruitfully in the framework of the triangle, and I think we should redouble our efforts to do so.
May I, in conclusion, say that it was a great honour to be able to address your association and that with everything that remains to be done, I personally, whenever I come to your country, feel a certain satisfaction that it has been given to me to try to contribute a little bit to the strengthening of the EC -Japan side of the triangle I spoke about.
Thank you very much gentlemen.
(This is the text of a speech given dy Mr. E. Wellenstein at the second annual convention of the Japan Society of EC Studies, reproduced from the tape. Editor is responsible for the inadequate expressions, if any.)
